Walker Bank & Trust Co. v. Spencer C. Taylor and State Bank of Provo : Brief of Respondent by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1963
Walker Bank & Trust Co. v. Spencer C. Taylor and
State Bank of Provo : Brief of Respondent
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
L. Tom Perry; Attorney for First National Bank of Logan;
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Walker Bank & Trust Co. v. Taylor, No. 9947 (Utah Supreme Court, 1963).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/4328
WALKER BANK & TRUST COM- I 1 
P ANY, a Utah corporation, (1 ~ •. 
Plaintiff-Respo1tdent, n. 1 1 i 1963 
v. ---·-------------·- --------------- _..:---~-~,~--;~:·,~-~~ 
Clerk, . t;;,..-crr.Wo~'99~f 
SPENCER C. TAYLOR, Bank 
Commissioner of the State of Utah, 
and STATE BANK OF PROVO, 
a Utah corporation, 
Defendants-Appellants 
RESPONDENT''S BRIEF 
Appeal from the Judgment of the District Court of 
Salt Lake County 
Honorable A. H. Ellett, Presiding 
Joseph S. Jones 
C. E. Henderson 
RAY, RAWLINS, JONES & 
HENDERSON 
800 Walker Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
.Attorneys for Respondent 
A. Pratt Kesler 
Attorney General 
H. Wright Volker 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 1 UtAI:i 
Attorneys for .Appellant \. lJNlViiSlTt OE ~ - ~ · 
Spencer C. TmyZor 
Peter W. Billings ~ APR 2 9 1965 
John F. Lee ~ 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN . \?. 
800 'Continental Bank Buildink LAW. LliRAR.~UA 
Salt Lake City, Utah ~ 
Attorneys for .Appellant 
State Bank of Provo 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF l~ONTENTS 
Page 
S'rATEMl•~Nrr OF THE KIND OF CASE .................... 1 
DISPOSrriON IN LOWER COURT.___________________________ 1 
RELIEF SOFGHT ON APPEAL ________________________________ 2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS·---------------------------·····------·------ 2 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1. SECTION 7-3-6, UT·AH COD·E AN-
NOT·ATI~D 1953, IN CLEAR AND UN-
AMBIGUOUS LANGUAGE PROSCRIBED 
THE E8TAB!L·I8HMENT BY THE DEFEND-
AN'T BANK OF SAID BRANlOH BANI( IN 
THE ClTY OF PROVO, UTAH. --------------------·-·- 3 
POINT 2. SEOTION 7-3-6, U·TAH CODE AN-
NOTATED 19·53, PROHIBlTS THE E:SIT·AB-
LISHME-NT OF A BRAN·CH BANK IN A 
GI·TY OF THE S.ECOND CLA8S WHER.E 
THERE IS ALREADY LOCAT·ED ONE OR 
MORE BRANCH B~NI<:S. ------------------------------------ 16 
POINT 3. PLAINTIFF I-I~S A RIGHT OF 
ACTION PREDICATED UPON DEFE·ND-
AN'l'S' VIOLXTION OF SIDCTION 7-3-6, 
UTAH CODE ANNOT·A!T'ED 1953. ---------------------- 25 
CONCLUSION -------------------------------------------------------------------- 34 
CASES CITED 
Allen v. Commissioner of CorporaJtions and 'Tax'ation, 
272 Mass. 502, 172 N.E. 643, 70 A.L.R. 1299 ............ 21 
Commercial State Bank of Roseville v. Gidney, 
(D.C.D.C., 1959), 174 F. Supp. 770, Mfd. 1960, 
108 U.S. Ap. D.C. 37, 278 F.2d 871. _________________________ 27 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued) 
Page 
Evans v. Reiser (1931), 78 Utah 253, 2 P.2d 615 ____________ 10 
Fratt v. Roibinson (9th Cir., 1959), 203 F.2d 627 .......... 30 
Land O'Lakes Creameries, Inc. v. Commodity Credit 
Corp. (8th Cir., 19'59), 265 F.2d 163 ........................ 22 
Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Public Se·rvice 
Commission (1945), 107 Utah 502, 155 P.2d 184 9 
National Bank of Detroit v. Wayne Oakland Bank 
(6th Cir., 1958), 252 F.2d 537, cert. denied 19·58, 
358 U.S. 8'30, 79 S. Ct. 50, 3 L.Ed. 2d 69 ________________ 27 
Salt Lake Union Stock Yards v. State T'ax Commission 
(1937), 93 Utah 166, 71 P.2d 538·-----------···----------------- 10 
Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.S. 288, 64 S. Ct. 5·59, 88 L.Ed. 
,,
4 
733 ----·--··-··-·----·--·---···------------------··---------···--·--····-------·-···· 29 
In Re Stevens Estate (1942), 102 U~tah 255, 130 P.2d 
85 ------------·····--------·-·-------··-----------·-·----------------------········-- 9 
Suburban Trust Oompany v. National Bank of West-
field (D.C.N.J., 1962), 211 F. Supp. 694 ________________ 27 
Union T·rus.t Co. v. Bimmons (1949), 116 Utah 422, 
211 P.2d 190 ···-·----·--··---·-------------·--··-----------------.4, 24, 27 
Utah Hotel Company v. Industrial ·Gommission (1944), 
107 Utah 24, 151 P.2d 467 ......... ·-----·------------·------·-------- 22 
BTAT,U·TE.S CITED 
Laws of Utah 1911, Chapter 25, Boo. 32·--------------------------· 13 
Laws of Utah 19·33, Chapter 6, Sec. !_ ___________________________ 14 
Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, Section 7 -3-6 ................ 14 
Securities Exchange Acl of 19·34, Sec. 10(h) 
(15 U.S.C.A. 78(j)) ----------······----·····-·········----··········· 29 
12 U.S.C.A., Sec. 36(c) .................................................... 15, 23 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued) 
Page 
7 -1-2~~ Utah Code Annotated 1953 .......................... 25, 31, 3~ 
7-1-26 l T tah Code Annotated 1953 .......................... 25, 31, 32 
7 -l-27 {Ttah Code Anrrot•ated 19·53 ... -------------------····------------ 31 
7 .:)-:> 1 T t.a h Code Annotated 1953...................................... 18 
7 -:~-6 Utah Code Annotated 1943...................................... 4 
7-3-6 U ta:h Code Annotated 1953 ............ 3, 4, 6, 7, 13, 14, 15 
16,18,19,20,21,23,25,27,32 
7-3-6.1 Utah Code Annotated 1953 .................................. 14 
7-3-6.2 Utah Code Annotated 1953.................................. 14 
7-3-6.3 Utah Code Annotated 1953 ............................... .4, 14 
7-6-7 Utah Code Annotated 1953 .... ·--------------------------------- 24 
16-10-100 Utah Code Annotated 1953.............................. 25 
16-10-101 Utah Code Annotated 1953 .............................. 2·5 
78-33-2 lJtah Code Annot.ated 19·53 ... ·------------------------------ 26 
OT·HE.R AU·THORITIEiS CITED 
50 A.L.R. 1340, p. 1342·------------------------------------------------------· 15 
7 Am. J ur. Banks, Sec. 2, p. 24.·---------------------------------------- 18 
7 Am. Jur. Banks, Sec. 23, pp. 39-40·------------------------------- 15 
7 Am. J ur. Banks, Sec. 25, p. 41._____________________________________ 18 
50 Am. J ur., Statutes, Sec. 225, pp. 204-209________________ 7 
82 C.J.S., Statutes, Sec. 322(2), pp. 577 et seq............. 7 
82 C.J.S. Statutes, Sec. 359, p. 761. _________________________________ 20 
82 C.J.S. Statutes, Se·c. 370(2), p. 857·--------------------------- 24 
15 Fletcher Cyclopedia Corporations (1961 Re-
vision), Sec. 7089, p. 118 ---------------------------------------- 2·5 
Patton's Digest Supplement, Banks and Banking, 
Appendix, Sec. 11, pp. 10-38.·------------------------------------ 15 
Restatement, Torts, Sec. 710 .. ------------------------------------------ 26 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
\VALT(l~~H B~\~K & TIU'ST CO~I-
PANY, a lftah eorporation, ) 
Plaint·iff-Bespondent, 
v. 
NPI~NC.l£R C. TAYLOR, Bank 
( \mnuissioner of the State of Utah, 
and S'TATI·~ BANK OF PROVO, 




STATEl\fENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action by plaintiff for a declaratory judg-
ment that the defendant, Bank Commissioner of the 
State of Utah, in authorizing the establishment by the 
th•t'r•nrlnnt, State Bank of Provo, of a br~anch bank in the 
City of Provo, Utah, and the establishment of such 
branch bank, violated the laws of this state, and for an 
injunction against the operation of such branch bank. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
'The case was tried to the court upon a stipulation 
of facts. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendants 
have appealed. 
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RELIEF SOUGH'T ON APPEAL 
The judgment of the trial court should be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The parties have stipulated the facts 1n this case 
(R. 7-41). The following is a summary of the material 
facts contained in the stipulation. 
On October 15, 1962, the defendant, State Bank of 
Provo (hereinafter referred to as the "defendant bank"), 
applied to the State Bank Commissioner for permission 
to establish a branch bank in the City of Provo, Utah, 
which is a city of the second class (R. 9). In seeking to 
establish said branch and in establishing the same, the 
defendant bank did not take over an existing hank (R. 9). 
On October 25, 1962, the Bank Commissioner, with-
out notice of or formal hearing on said application, 
authorized the defendant bank to establish and conduct 
a branch bank in Provo (R. 9), and on December 20, 
1962, subsequent to the commencement of this action, 
the defendant bank commenced to regularly transact a 
customary banking business at said branch (R. 10). 
Unless the trial court's injunction is sustained by this 
court, the defendant bank will continue to operate the 
branch bank (R. 11). 
At the times referred to herein, the plaintiff was 
regularly conducting a customary banking business at 
its branch 1banking house in Provo (R. 10), which it had 
acquired by a statutory merger of the Farmers' and 
Merchants' Bank, a state hank, with and into plaintiff 
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a~ the resulting bank (R. 8). Prior to and until said 
nwrger, the ],anners' and Merchants' Bank was regularly 
transacting a customary banking business in Provo at 
said banking house acquired by plaintiff as a result of 
said merger (R. 8). Also, at the times referred to here-
in, the First Security Bank of Utah, N. A., was regularly 
transacting a customary banking business at its branch 
bank located in Provo (R. 10). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1. 
SECTION 7-3-6, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
1953, IN CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS LAN-
GUAGE PROSCRIBED TI-lE ESTABLISH-
MENT BY ·THE DEFENDANT BANK OF 
SAID BRANCH BANK IN THE CITY OF 
PROVO, UTAI1. 
Contrary to defendants' initial statement under 
Point 1 of their argument, plaintiff's principal point 
argued in the trial court and upon which it r-elies to 
sustain that court's judgment, is that Section 7-3-6 pro-
hibits the operation of branches in any city not of the 
first class where a bank is already located, except only 
in the case where a branch results from a bank taking 
over an existing bank. Subject to exceptions not involved 
here, Section 7-3-6 is the same as originally enacted by 
the legislature in 1933. Said section provides in part, as 
follows: 
"Except in cities of the first class or within 
unincorporated areas of a county in which a city 
of the first class is located, no branch bank shall 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
4 
he established in any city or town in which is 
located a bank or banks, state or national, regular-
ly transacting a customary banking business, 
unless the ba:n.k seeking to establish such branch 
shall take over an existing bank. ... " 
Provo is not a city of the first class. At the times 
involved herein, the defendant bank was, and now is, 
located in Provo, regularly transacting a customary 
banking business in said city (R. 8). In such cases, the 
statute unequivocally provides that "no branch shall be 
established ... unless the hank seeking to establish such 
branch shall take over an existing han:k," and, Section 
7-3-6.3, enacted in 1953, provides that from and aft.er 
the effective date thereof " ... no branch shall be estab-
lished or .authorized to conduct a banking business except 
as hereinbefore in Section 7-3-6 expressly provided." 
(Italics added) 
The location of the defendant bank in Provo oper-
ated under the statute to prohibit it and any other bank 
from establishing a branch bank in Provo, except only 
by taking over an existing hank. ·That such is the mean-
ing and effect of the statute was declared by this court 
in Union Trust Co. v. Simmons, (1949) 116 Utah 422, 
211 P.2d 190. In this case, Union Trust Company filed 
with the Bank Commissioner an application to establish 
a branch hank in Ogden, Utah. ·The Banik: Commissioner 
refused to consider said application because Union Trust 
Company had not obtained the consent of the existing 
banks in Ogden as required by Section 7-3-6, Utah Code 
Annotated 1943, which, in the same language as the 
present statute, prohibited the establishment of a branch 
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5 
bank in a ei ty not of the first class, but contained alter-
nate provisos reading "unless the bank seeking to estab-
lish ~ueh branch shall take over an existing bank or 
obtain the consent of all banks therein located . .. .'' 
(Italics added) The Union Trust Company petitioned 
the court for an alternative writ of mandamus to compel 
the Bank Commissioner to act upon its application to 
establish a branch bank in Ogden. 
The issues before the court in the Union Trust Com-
pany case wer·e whether the consent proviso contained 
in ~aid section was unconstitutional and, if so, whether 
the consent proviso was severable from the alternative 
proviso with respect to taking over an existing bank. 
The court held that the cons·ent proviso in said section 
was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power, 
but that the consent proviso was severable. In reaching 
its decision as to the severability of the consent proviso, 
the court considered and resolved the question as to the 
Ineaning and effect to be given the statute upon the 
consent proviso being excluded therefrom. On this sub-
ject, the court said: 
"The part of the statute first quoted above, 
establishes two methods of establishing a branch 
bank, compliance with either of which will make 
it possible for the bank conunissioner to deter-
mine the issue of convenience and advantage in 





Taj{e over an existing bank, or 
Secure the consent of the existing 
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The second m·ethod is unconstitutional for the 
reasons heretofore outlined. 
* * * 
There remains then one m.ethod whereby 
branch banks may be established, and that by 
taking over an ·existing bank. Petitioner has not 
complied with any of the requirements for estab-
lishrnent of a branch bank under this method; 
therefore, the petition for a writ of mandamus 
must be and is denied." (Italics added) 
In the concurring opinion, it is stated: 
"Under thes-e circumstances we must con-
strue the statute the same as though the unconsti-
tutional provision had never been inserted. If 
we delete this provision then it is cle.ar and un-
a;mbiguous that before a branch bank cam be es-
tablished in the citie.s in question an existing bank 
1nust be taken over." (Italics added) 
WHEN THE LEGISLATIVE INTENT IS MANIFESTED BY 
CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS LANGUAGE, THERE IS NO 
OccASION FOR THE CouRT To REsORT TO THE RuLES 
OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION. 
In order to persuade the court to reverse the trial 
court's decision giving effect to the plain and clear mean-
ing of Section 7-3-6, the essence of defendants' argument 
is to the effect that the enactment of said section by the 
1933 Legislature created a special antitrust act having 
as its purpose " ... to protect unit banks in cities outside 
Salt Lruke City from invasion by larger city banks ... " 
(defendants' Brief, p. 47). Consonant with this nebulous 
theory as to the legislative objective in the passag·e of 
Section 7-3-6, defendants would persuade the court (de .. 
fendants' Brief, pp. 37 -38) to conclude: 
".3. There are no restrictions on banks es-
tablishing branches in their own communities. 
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"-L ln eitiP::; and town~ otlH•r than Ralt Lake 
City, out~ide hanks may not invadP such cotn-
lll unitiPs \Vi th branches unless an exisiting inde-
pPn<lc·n t unit bank desires to sell out." 
aml to rewrite the pertinent part of Section 7-3-6 to read 
( ( 1~ •fpn clan{~' proposed change indicated by brackets anrl 
italic~): 
"'Except in cities of the first class, or ·within 
tmincorporated .areas of a county in which a city of 
the first class is located, no branch bank shall be 
established in any city or town in which is located 
a bank or banks, state or national, regularly trans-
acting a customary banking business, unless the 
bank se-eiking to establish such br.aneh shall take 
over an existing bank [or has its head .office lo-
cated in sttch city or town]." 
To so distort the language of Section 7-3-6 and 
the intention of the legislature expressed therein would 
abrogate the basic doctrine followed by the trial court 
and laid down in numerous decisions by this and other 
eourts throughout the United States, which uniformly 
hold that when the intent of the legislature has been 
expressed in clear and unambiguous language, it is the 
duty of the courts to give effect to the statute in accord-
ance ,,~ith the language employed therein and in such 
eases here is no occasion to resort to rules in aid of 
statutory construction or search for the statute's mean-
ing beyond the statue itself. This is but a corollary to 
tht> basic concept of our government that the courts have 
no constitutional authority to legislate. 82 C.J.S., Stat-
1~trs, Ser. 3:22(2), pp. 577 et seq.; 50 Am. Jur., Statutes, 
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Sec. 225, pp. 204-209, citing numerous cases, states the 
doctrine as follows: 
"A statute is not open to construction as a 
n1atter of course. It is open only where the lan-
guage used in the statute requires interpr-etation, 
that is, where the statute is ambiguous, or will 
hear two or more constructions, or is of such 
doubtful or obscure meaning, that reasonable 
minds might be uncertain or disagree as to its 
Ineaning. Where the language of a statute is 
plain and unambiguous and conveys a clear and 
definite meaning, there is no occasion for resort-
ing to the rules of statutory interpretation, and 
the court has no right to look for or impose 
another meaning. In the case of such unambiguity, 
it is the established policy of the courts to regard 
the statute as meaning what it says, and to avoid 
giving it .any other construction than that which 
its words demand. The p1ain and obvious mean-
ing of the language used is not only the safest 
guide to follow in construing it, but it has been 
presumed conclusively that the clear and explicit 
terms of a statute expresses the legislative inten-
tion, so that such pl.ain and obvious provisions 
must control. A plain and unambiguous statute 
is to be applied, and not interpreted, since such 
a statute speaks for its·elf, and any attempt to 
make it clearer is a vain labor and tends only to 
obscurity. In accordance with these rules, fre-
quent references may be found in judicial opinions 
to the clear, definite, distinct, evident, exact, ex-
plicit, express, ohvious, plain, positive, simple, 
unambiguous, unequivocal, or unmistaka:ble lan-
guage of the· statutes under consideration. How-
ever, where the language of a statute is ambigu-
ous, and there is doubt as to the meaning intendea 
to be expressed thereby, resort may be had to 
various rules and sources, hereinafter considered, 
for determining such meaning." 
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In t·he case of In Re Stevens Estate, (19-l-:2) 10:2 
litah 255, 130 P.~d 85, a s~ction of the probate eode wa~ 
involved which provided that "if the executor or adlnini-
strator is a creditor of the decedent, his clailn, duly 
antlwntieatt>d by affidavit, must be presented for allow-
ante or rejection to the court ... " It was contended in 
this ea~P that the claim of a corporate creditor of the 
estate required the approval of the eourt under said 
statute, because the administrator of the estate was the 
president of the claimant corporation and owner of one-
fourth of its stock. In answer to said contention, the 
court held: 
"To this view we cannot subscribe. The word-
ing of the statute is plain and unambiguous. Here 
the ad1ninistrator as Frank J. Stevens, personally 
rna:kes no clain1 as a 'creditor of the decedent'. 
It is not 'his' elaim. It is the clairn of a corpora-
tion of which he is a stockholder. This court will 
not read into this statute by judicial legislation 
the words 'or has som·e interest, direct or indi-
rect.' The language of the statute is plain and 
its meaning is clear, in which case there is no 
occasion to seareh for its meaning beyond the 
statute itself. See in accord, Salt Lake Union 
Stock Yards v. State Tax Commission, 93 Utah 
166, 71 P.2d 538; Riches v. Hadlock, 80 Utah 265, 
15 P.2d 283, rehearing denied 80 Utah 298, 15 
P.2d 295; Evans v. Reiser, 78 Utah 253, 2 P.2d 
615, rehearing denied 78 Utah 307, 3 P.2d 253." 
Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Public Service 
Commission, (1945) 107 Utah 502, 155 P.2d 184, involved 
the provision of a statute relating to a stay or suspen-
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sion of an order or decision of the Public Service Conl-
mission, and the Supreme Court s.aid : 
"We therefore address ourselves to its mean-
ing, keeping in mind one of the cardinal rules of 
statutory construction, viz., that the interpreta-
tion must be based on the language used, and that 
the court has no power to rewrite a statute to 
make it conform to an intention not expressed. 
'The legislative intent being plainly expressed, so 
that the act read by its·elf, or in connection with 
other statutes pertaining to the same subject, is 
clear, certain and unambiguous, the courts have 
only the simple and obvious duty to enforce the 
law according to its terms. . . . If .a legislative 
enactment violates no constitutional provision or 
principle, it must be deemed its own sufficient 
and conclusive evidence of the justice, propriety 
and P'olicy of its passage.' 2 Lewis' Sutherland 
Statutory Construction (2nd Ed.) p. 701." 
With respect to a sales tax statute, this court said 
in Salt Lake Union Stock Yards v. State Tax Commis-
sion, (1937) 93 lTtah 166, 71 P.2d 538: 
"We .are required to give the words used 
their natural and ordinary n1eaning. The rule is 
well expressed in 25 R.C.L. 962, as follows: 'When 
the language of a statute is plain and unambigu-
ous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, 
there is no occasion for resorting to the rules of 
statutory interpretation and construction; the 
statute must be given its plain .and obvious mean-
ing.'" 
In Evans v. Reiser, (1931) 78 Utah 253, 2 P.2d 
615, the controlling statute provided that "any ballot 
mar.ked by the voter in any other manner than is author-
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izP<l in this ehaph•r shall be n•jectt>d.'' As pointe(l out in 
t liP opinion, it was contended: 
"lt is ab;o earnestly urged on behalf of the 
n·~pondt>nt that the spirit and purpose of our 
election laws will not pennit of following the 
ldter thereof, that our statute should be given a 
lilH'rnl c:onstruetion, so that ballots will not be 
l'l'.iPcted for slight or trivial causes. 
* * * 
"It is further urged that an adherence to the 
letter of the law will result in the rejection of 
nlunerous ballots, and the will of a majority of 
tlt(' voters Inay not be given effect." 
In answer to said contentions, the court held: 
"The provisions of our statute which directs 
that 'any ballot marked by the voter in any other 
m.anner than as authorized in this chapter shall 
be rejected' is plain, certain, and definite. It is 
not in conflict with or modified by any other pro-
Yisions of the election law, and it is mandatory. 
Under such circumstances there is no room for 
construction, and it is our plain duty to give it 
effect. As illustrative of the duty of the courts 
under such circumstances, we quote the following 
language from Bl.ack on Interpretation of Laws, 
Hornbook Series (2nd Ed.) pp. 51-53: 
"\Vhere the language of a statute is plain and 
unambiguous, and conveys a definite and sensible 
meaning, it is the duty of the court to enforce it 
according to the obvious meaning of the words 
employed, without .attempting to change it by 
adopting a different constn1ction, based upon 
some supposed policy of the legislature with re-
ference to the subject n1atter, or upon considera-
tions of injustice or inconvenience resulting from 
the literal interpretation of the statute, or even 
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to give the law that efficiency and due effect 
·which it will lack when taken literally as it stands. 
'In the case supposed, where the language of 
the statute is free from ambiguity and conveys a 
definite and sensible meaning, the courts should 
not hesitate to give it a literal interpretation 
merely because they have doubts as to the wisdom 
or expediency of the enactment. In such a case, 
these are not pertinent inquiries for the judicial 
tribunals. If there be any unwisdom in the law, 
it is for the legislature to remedy it. For the 
courts the only rule is "ita lex scripta est."' 
Neither have the judges any authority, in such a 
case, to put upon the statute a construction dif-
ferent from its natural and obvious meaning in 
oonsideration of the consequences which may re-
sult from it. Any evil consequences to the public 
which may flow from the statute may be con-
sidered when its meaning is doubtful, in order to 
give it a more beneficial construction, but when 
the legislative intent is clearly expressed·, such 
consequences can not at all be considered.' 
"~t\..11 of the text-writers and the adjudicated 
cases dealing with the subject recognize the 
general rule as stated by the able author from 
whose work we have just quoted." 
THE CLEAR MEANING oF THE STATUTE IS CoNsiST-
ENT WITH AND CoNFIRMED BY ITs LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY AND THE PuBLIC. PoLICY WITH REsPECT 
TO BRANCH BANKING. 
In view of the doctrine established by the authorities 
hereinabove referred to, this phase of plaintiffs' argu-
nl'ent under Point 1 is pertinent only to rebut the in-
ference that plaintiff may concur with defendants' views 
as to the purpose of the statute by failing to respond 
thereto. It is in this respect, therefore, that we undertake 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
13 
to demonstrate that defendants' argument relating to 
the legislative purpose of Section 7-3-6 is not supported 
by the legislative history of said section of the public 
policy reflected in the enactment thereof. 
As n1ight be supposed from defendants' selected quo-
tal ions froxn the Congressional Record, there is an 
abundance of available literature containing a variety 
ot' viPws on branch banking, both by the advocates and 
opponents thereof. In the final analyses, however, it is 
the province of the legislature to resolve this controver-
Hial subject by prescribing the conditions and limitations 
on branch banking. ~rhe Utah Legislature has done so, 
and with respect to the issue in this case, has expressly 
prohibited the establishment of a branch bank " ... in 
any city or town in which is located a bank. .. " This clear 
manifestation of legislative intent is, as hereinafter 
H~lo"-n, consistent with the legislative history of Section 
7-3-6 and the public policy underlying the legislative en-
aetments of this and other states relating to branch bank-
ing. 
The legislative prohibition contained in S.ection 7-3-6 
with respect to the establishment of branch banks in cities 
and towns other than Salt Lake City, had its genesis in 
the Branch Ban:1.~ng Act of 1911 (Laws of Utah 1911, 
Chapter 25, Section 32), which prohibited the establish-
ment of branch banks and required that all branch hanks 
or offices then in operation throughout the state be 
closed and discontinued within one year from the 
effective date of the Acl This statewide prohibition 
against branch banking continued in effect until 1933 
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(Section 7-3-6, Revised Statutes of Ut.ah, 1933) when 
said section was amended by Chapter 6, Sec. 1, Laws of 
Utah, 1933. The effect and purpose of said amendment 
were simply to relax the rigid statewide prohibition 
against branch banking by permitting the establishment 
of branch banks in Salt Lake City, but the amendment, 
with the provisos hereinbefore mentioned, continued in 
effect the restriction against the establishment of branch-
es in cities or towns other than Salt Lake City, where .a 
bank is already located. The pertinent provisions of 
Section 7-3-6 of the 1953 code·, as amended, are identical 
to those contained in the 1933 Act. The proviso with 
respect to taking over an existing bank r·ecognizes and 
resolves the question with respeet to the status of a bank 
in a city or town other than in Salt Lake City, which 
consummates a merger or consolidation with another 
bank. 
In 1953, the legislature amended Section 7-3-6 so 
as to permit the establishment of a branch bank not only 
in Salt Lake City, but also within unincorporated areas 
of Salt Lruke County, but retained the prohibition against 
esta:blishing branches in eitie.s other than Salt Lake City. 
The smne legislature recognized that branch banks may 
have been established and were being operated ·without 
statutory authority (Section 7-3-6.1) and validated the 
same (Section 7 -3-6.2). In so doing, the legislature re-
affirmed its policy with respect to branch banking in 
providing under Section 7-3-6.3 that no branch should 
be estahl.ished or authorized to conduct a banking busi-
ness except as expressly provided by Section 7-3-6. 
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'l'ht> branch banking statntc>s of the various states 
n•t'IPd a public policy of either prohibiting or placing 
substantial n·st rictions upon the establishment of branch 
hnnks. 7 Am. tJ nr., Banks, Sec. ~3, pp. 39-40. Patton·~ 
Digest Supplement, Banks and Banking, Appendix, Sec-
ti,ln 11, lJll. 1 0-:3S, whieh contains a current digest of 
~tate banking statutes affecting the establishment of 
branelt~.:·~, shows that states having large populations 
and Bwtropolitan areas, such as Florida, Illinois, ~Iin­
twsota, Oldahon1a, Texas and West Virginia, neverthe-
h•ss prohibit any branch banking. National banks are 
subject to the same restrictions in the establishment 
of hranelws as are imposed by the laws of the state in 
which they are located with respect to state banks. 12 
lT .S. C.A., See. 36 (e). 
The branch banking prohibition contained in the 
Branch Banking Act of 1911, the predecessor of Section 
7-3-6 of the 1953 Code, and as carried forward in said 
section with respect to cities and towns other than Salt 
LakP City, r·eflects the prevailing public policy declared 
by the courts with respect to this subject, even in states 
in which the statutes are silent regarding the establish-
ment of branch baTIJks. In an annotation on branch banks, 
;}I_) A.L.R.. 1340, at p. 1342, it is stated: 
"The view has been taken that public policy 
does not favor the establishment of branches by 
state banks, and that they should not be permitted 
to establish branches in the absence of express 
statutory authority, banks standing on a different 
basis in this regard from private corporations 
generally. Thus, in ~forehead Bkg. Co. v. Tate 
(1898) 122 N.C. 313, 30 S.E. 341, the court says 
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that it would not be willing to sanction the prac-
tice of e-stablishing branch banks or agencies to 
do a banking business, unless they are expressly 
authorized by legislative authority obtained in 
the charter; that the matter of allowing banks 
to establish branch banks or agencies is at least 
of doubtful, if not bad, policy. 
"And it is held in Bruner v. Citizens' Bank 
(1909) 134 Ky. 283, 120 S.W. 345, that, in the 
absence of express legislative authority, the 
power of a state ban!k to establish a branch does 
not follow by implication as a reasonable or nec-
essary incident to the right to do a banking busi-
ness, and that such an institution has no right to 
establish a branch bank." 
POINT 2. 
SECTION 7-3-6, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
1953, PROHIBITS T'HE EiSTABLISHMENT 
OF A BRANCH BANK IN A CITY OF THE 
SECOND CLABS WHERE THERE IS AL-
READY LOCATED ONE OR MORE BRANCH 
BANKS. 
The trial court based its decision upon Point 1 of 
our .argument (R. 43). In so doing it followed the estab-
lished policy of this and other courts of enforcing the 
law in accordance with the legislative intent clearly mani-
fested by the language of the statute in question. With 
respect to the question of where a bank is located and 
transacting business within the meaning of Section 7-3-6, 
the trial court expressed the opinion that "I think this 
Commissioner (State Bank Commissioner) has erron-
eously ruled for six years, where he said there is a dif-
ference between a branch and a bank" (R. 43). As we 
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wi 11 endeavor to demonstrate, the trial rourt ·~ op1n1on 
in this respect, PVPn though the decision of the court was 
not based thereon, is supported by sound prineipals of 
law and statutory construction. 
The two pren1ises on which defendants base their 
argument under this point are: First, that plaintiff is 
not transacting a banking business at its Provo branch, 
and second, that a bank is a separate and distinct institu-
tion fron1 its branch. 
With respect to the first premise, defendants state 
at p. 6 of their Brief, "From a reading of the whole of 
Section 7-3-6, it is clear that the term 'banlk' when used 
unconnected with ~the word 'branch' means a unit bank. 
Thus in the first paragraph of the section the language 
•the business of every bank shall be conducted only a.t 
i b; banking house ... ' must refer to a unit bank and not 
to a branch." This argument is n1ost readily disposed of 
by the stipulation of facts which states "the plaintiff 
was regularly transacting a customary banking busi-
ness at its branch in said City of Provo; ... " (R. 10). 
With respect to said second premise, defendants rely 
upon and quote from the Attorney General's opinion, 
as follows: "In addition to the provision noted, Section 
1-3-6 in several instances, uses the term 'bank' to connote 
an institution, separate and distinct from, and not in-
clusive of, a 'branch'." However, further on in defend-
ants' Brief at p. 18 thereof, the defendants recognize the 
infinnity of the proposition that a bank is a separate in-
stitution from a branch, wherein defendants state "We 
do not contend that plaintiff's Provo branch is a differ-
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ent and separate entity in Provo." The last staten1ent is 
correct and sustained by the authorities hereinafter cited. 
Defendants also rely upon the fact that Section '7-
3-6 in several instances uses the term "hank" as distin-
guished from the term "branch bank." An examination 
of the language of said section discloses that the distinc-
tion therein made between hanks and branch banks has 
no significance in resolving the question of where a bank-
ing institution is located and transacting business. \Vhen 
the legislature in 1933 relaxed its statewide prohibition 
against a bank having n1ore than a single banking house 
in which to transact business, it was r·equired to differ-
ent:late between the single banking house to which a 
bank had theretofore been restricted and the additional 
banking house in which a banJk could transact business if 
authorized under the 1933 amendment. 
IIowever, that portion of the statute referring to a 
city or town in which is located a bank transacting a 
banking business is directed at the pillce where a banking 
corporation transacts business. As concurred in by de-
fendants, a hank is and is required by the laws of this 
state to be, a single corporate entity. (Section 7-3-5, 
Utah Code Annotated 1953). Branch hanks are not 
regarded as separate entities. (7 Am. Jur., Banks, Sec. 
25, p. 41). Traditionally, the term "bank" connotes the 
place at which a banking business is transacted. (7 Am. 
Jur., Banks, Sec. 2, p. 24). The business of a bank must 
be conducted only at a hat"'lking house established pur-
suant to law. (Section 7-3-6). 
It would he inconsistent with the foregoing and in 
conflict with well settled law applicable generally to a 
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<·orporate Pntity, to hold that a banking eorporation 
rPg-ularly trnn~aeting a cust01nary banking lm:.;;ine::;:.;; at 
its authorized banking house in Provo is nevertheless not 
l<w.nted tht>rP, hut it.-; situs is only at such banking house 
as lms hePn designated as its head office. To give Sec-
tion 7-3-6 the effect urged by defendants would have the 
p;rotesque rt>~ult that First Security Bank of Utah, N.A., 
which is the largest bank in lTtah and transacts a larger 
voltune of business in Salt La:ke County than in any 
other eounty in this state, is nevertheless not located in 
Salt Lake County because its head office is in Ogden. 
In order to justify the e~stablishment of the branch 
in question and accomn1odate the position taken by de-
fendants under Points 1 and 2 of their argmnent, the 
eoart would be required to judicially amend the pertin-
ent provisions of Seetion 7-3-6 so as to read (defendants' 
propOS(-'d amendments indic-ated by brackets and italics), 
a.s follows: 
"The business of every bank shall be con-
ducted only at its [main] banking house .... 
* * * 
"Except in cities of the first class, or with-
in tmincorporated areas of a county in which a 
ei ty of the first class is located, no branch bank 
shall be established in any city or town in 
which is located [the head of-fice of] a hank or 
banks, state or national, regularly transacting a 
customary banking business, unless the bank 
seeking to establish such branch shall take over 
an exis.ting bank [or has its head office located in 
such c-ity or town]." 
To so judicially amend Section 7-3-6 would have an 
effect ·which the legislature obviously did not intend: 
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First Security Bank of Utah, N.A., the largest bank in 
the State of Utah, could saturate Ogden City with 
bran0hes because its head office is located in that city. 
Also assume for illustration, that two or more banks 
having their head offices in different cities or towns, 
effect a mergeT or consolidation. Nothing in the statutes 
prevent the designation of the head office of the re-
sulting banking corporation in any town in which one 
of the constituent banks is located. According to defend-
ants' interpretaJtion of the statute, the legislature dele-
gated to the participants in such merger or consolidation 
the power to determine in which of such cities it could 
establish brancb. banks without statutory restriction, be-
cause, as argued by defendants, the controlling factor in 
the estwhlishment of branch banks is the plaee desig-
nated as the head office of a bank. 
THE .AnMISTRATIVE INTERPRETATION RELIED UPON 
BY DEFENDANTS AFFORDS NO AID IN THE CoNSTRUC-
TION OF SECTION 7-3-6. 
In support of Point 1 of defendants' argument, 
def.endants cite cases in which :the courts as an aid in the 
construction of an ambiguous statute, have given weight 
to contemporaneous administrative construction of such 
statu!te where such construction has been placed thereon 
by ·the public official charged with its administration and 
has been consistent, obs·erved and acted upon for a long 
period of time. 82 C.J.S., 8tatutes, Sec. 359, p. 761, et 
seq. In this connecltion it should be pointed out, that the 
B.ank Commissioner, prior to the authorization of the 
branch bank in question, had never construed Seetion 
7-3-6 as authorizing the establishment of a branch bank 
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in a <·a~P ~ueh a~ that hPI'ore thi~ ('OUI"t when', a~ eovered 
h~- Point 1 ol' our argument, tlw legislature has by un-
atnbiguous language expressly prohibited the establish-
ment of branch banks. 
l n only one instance, approxhnately 28 years after 
tl11' enactnwnt of Section 7-3-6 in 1933, has the Bank 
Commi~sioner by official action ta:ken the position under 
~aid section tha;t a bank has no situs in a city in which it 
has a branch bank regularly transacting a custmnary 
banking business. The instance referred to is when the 
Bank Cmnmissioner on November 9, 1961 authorized the 
P~tablish1nent of a branch in Tooele City where a branch 
bank of First Security Bank of Utah, N.A. was trans-
aeting a banking business (R. 12). In such a case, the 
eonds hold that an ad1ninistrative interpretation of a 
statute is not entitled to any weight. In Allen v. Com-
missiourr of Corporatiort.S and Taxation., 272 .h.!russ. 502, 
17:2 N.E. 643, 70 A.L.R. 1299, it was urged that the de-
partlnental construction of an incmne tax statute was 
entitled to weight in det.ermining its meaning, and the 
court held: 
"The departmental construction of St. 1928, c. 
217, § 2, the statute at present governing the 
subject, has not been long continued, and the 
rule as to weight to be attributed to such con-
struction when long continued and sanctioned by 
the acquiescence of the Legislature, illustrated by 
Burrage v. County of Briston, 210 Mass. 299, 301, 
96 N.E. 719, is not applicable. Moreover, that rule 
cannot be invoked against the plain words of the 
statute." 
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In Land O'Lakes Creameries, Inc. v. Commodity Credvt 
Corp. (Bth Circuit, 1959), 265 F.2d 163, the court states: 
"It is contended by Land O'La1kes that the 
promulgaJtion of Department Announcen1ent 112 
was tantamount to an administrative interpreta-
tion of the Agricultural Act of 1949 which is en-
titled to controlling weight. The argument rs not 
convincing. The rule cannot be here invoked he-
cause the statute is not ambiguous, nor has the 
so-called interpretation been continuous nor con-
temporaneous with the enactment of the statute. 
In any event, the mterprertation must he reason-
able, and it cannot confer rights inconsistent with 
the ·express terms of the ·statute. At best the ad-
ministrative interpretation is not controlling on 
the courts. Woods v. Benson Hotel Corp., 8 Gir., 
f77 F.2d 543." 
When the meaning of the statute is ascertainahle 
from the language expressed therein, there is no occasion 
to resort to the administra1tive interpretation which may 
have been placed thereon by an administrative official. 
An administrative interpr:eta~tion contrary to the legis-
lative intent must be set aside as a violation of the stat-
ute. A case in point is Utah Flotel C01npa.ny v. Industrial 
Com1n'£ssion (1944), 107 Utah 24, 151 P.2d 467, which in-
volved a review of an order of the Industrial Commis-
sion holding the petitioner liable under certam provisions 
of the Employment Security Act. The opinion of the 
court, citing Alvord'1s Article in 40 Columbia Law Review 
252, reads, in part, as follows: 
"Alvord states that the courts will not and 
should not substitute their opinions for that of 
the adminis traAtive officials in determining the 
policy of legislative regulations. On the other 
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lmnd, whPrP an intPrprdive regulation is involved, 
the ultimatu que~tion before the court is: \Yhat 
doPH the Htatute mean~ 
''The various sections of Title -1:2, U.C.A. 19±3 
imposed liability upon the hotel company to make 
a contribution for the fund. This liability wa3 
ereated by statute. l't existed even though the 
tribunal charged with the administration of the 
Act erroneously thought that Act did not apply 
in the case of 'name bands.' Such an erroneous 
construction could not have the effect of amend-
ing the statute or of cancelling the statutory lia-
bility of the employer. To hold otherwise would 
permit the administrative tribunal to, in effect, 
arnend a staJtute by ~the adoption of erroneous in-
terpretativ-e regul'ation. Construction is not legis-
lative and should not be given that effect." 
Defendants c.ite the instance when the Comptroller 
of the Currency, who is not entrusted with the adminis-
tration of Section 7-3-6, approved an api)licatioin of the 
l''irst National Bank of Logan to establish a branch bank 
in the City of ·Logan in n•Liance upon the .action of the 
Bank Connnissioner in this caS'e ( R. 12). The facts are 
~imilar to those in the present case and an action has 
been filed by plaintiff against the Comptroller of the 
( \nTPncy .and the First National Bank of Logan (Civil 
Xo. C-131-63), contesting ·the validity of the establish-
ment of such branch in Logan. In view of the branch 
banking statute .applicable to national banks (12 U.S.C.A. 
~ee. 36 (c), the decision of this court in this case will be 
determinative of said Federal suit. 
Finally, defendants argue that the 1963 amendment 
of Section 7-3-6 whicl1 retained the provisions thereof 
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under consideration in this case, supports the Bank Com-
nliss.ioner's interpretation in the single in'Stance above 
referred to. In this respect, 82 C.J.S., Statutes, Sec. 
370(2) at p. 857, states: 
"At best the reenactment of statutes is a 
nebulous foundation for statutory construction, 
since it is merely one factor in the total effort 
to give fair meaning to languag-e, and the rule 
that administrative construction recelive·s legisla-
tive approval by reenactment of a statutory pro-
vision without material change is no more than 
an aid in statutory construction, useful at times 
in resolving statutory ambiguities." 
Point 2 of our argument is consistent with Section 
7-6-7, Utah Code Annotated 1953. This court h.as de-
clared that in cities other than Sa1t Lake City there is 
only "one method whereby branch banks may be estab-
lished, and that by taking ove·r .an existing ban1c" Union 
Trust Co. v. Simmons (supra). Consistent with the pro-
viso r-eferred to by the court and resolving the question 
a;s to the status, rights and powers of the resulting bank 
with respect to a branch hank established through a mer-
ger or consolidation, Section 7-6-7 provides : 
"7 -6-7. Sltatus of resulting state bank -
Rights, powers, duties-Reference in writings. 
-A. The resulting state bank shall be eonsidered 
the s·ame business and corporate entity as each 
constituent hank with all the rights, powers, and 
duties of each constituent bank except as limited 
by the charter and by-laws of the resulting state 
bank." 
Contrary to defendants' contention, the rights ac-
quired by the resulting corporation are not limited to 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
<'ontradual rightH. 13 Ij,ldeher Cyeloperlia Corporations 
( l!Hil H(•Vi~ion), s('('. 708~), p. 11~. ~l'dions 16-10-100 and 
lli-10-101, lTtah Code Annatated 1953, arr further illus-
trations of statutory provisions which continue the cor-
poratP entity in exis.tence for various purposes, although 
in a g-Pneral sense the corporate life has expired. 
POINT 3. 
PLAINTIFF HAS A RIGHT OF ACTION 
PREDICATED UPON DEFENDAN·TS' VIO-
LATION OF SECTION 7-3-6, UTAH CODE 
ANNOTATED 1953. 
The trial court held that the Bank Commissioner's 
authoriz:ation for the establish1nent of said branch bank 
and the establishn1ent thereof by the defendant bank were 
in violation of Section 7-3-6. Defendants seek to nullify 
the judgment of the trial court on the grounds that (1) 
no statute expressly authorizes a right of action for such 
violation and ( 2) the ad1ninistrative review provided for 
;.mder Sedion 7-1-26, Utah Code AnnotaJted 1953, -with 
respect to action taken by the Bank Con1Illissioner in 
the exercise of his discretionary powers, coupled with the 
penal enforcement provided for under Section 7-1-23, 
l~tah Code Annotated 1953, provide the exclusive and 
an adequate remedy for such violation. 
The argument upon even a cursory analysis refutes 
itself: The issue in this case is not whether the Bank 
Cmmnissioner abused the discretionary power vested in 
him under the statute. Moreover, the legislature could 
not reasonably expect that pursuant to Section 7-1-237 
the Bank Commissioner would inform the County At-
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torney that the defendant hank had violated the law in 
the establishment of said branch banik, ·when the Bank 
Commissioner himself authorized the defendant to estab-
lish the branch. 
In a variety of cases, including deeisions of this 
and other courts involving branch banking, the courts 
have recognized that a private right of action may be 
predicated upon the violation of a statute prohibiting 
the doing of an act, although n-o such c:ause of a:ction is 
expressly provided by such statute. The rule is recog-
nized by the Restatement cited by defendants (Restate-
ment, Tor1ts, Sec. 710) and is illustrated by the cases 
hereinafter referred to. 
Plaintiff is not seeking a judicial review of an ad-
minis,trative decision of the Bank Commissioner made 
within the orbit of the discretionary powers vested in 
him by the legislature. It is plaintiff's contention and 
the trial court held that the· establishment and operation 
of said branch bank violated the statute in question. 
As a remedy for the enforooment of its right of action, 
plaintiff has invoked the Declaratory Judgment Act 
(Chapter 33, Title 78, Utah Code Annotated 1953) and 
sought injunctive relief on the basis that the defendant 
will continue its violation of the law unless restrained 
frmn so doing (R. 11). The Declaratory Judgment Act 
(Section 78-33-2) expressly provides for judicial relief 
in such cases : 
"Any person interested under a deed, will 
or written contract, or whose rights, status or 
other legal relations are affected by a statute, 
municipal ordinance, contract or franchise, may 
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have dt~tcrminPd any qtw~tion of construction or 
validity nrising under the in~t ruin('nt, st'atuh', 
ordinaneP, contra0t or franchise and obtain a de-
claration of rights, status or other legal relations 
thereunder." 
In Union Trust Oo. v. Simmons (supra), this court 
reeognized a bank's right to seek judicial review of the 
Bank Conunissioner's administrative decision in refus-
ing to eo11~ider an application to establish a branch ban:k, 
PVen though the Bank Commissioner's action was in ac-
eordanoe \\·ith the consent proviso of Section 7-3-6, held 
unconstitutional, and, as the c;ourt finally resolved the 
i~stws, the petitioner would not have been entitled to 
relief irrespective of the constitutionality of said proviso. 
The right to invoke the judicial powe-r to review the 
applieation of the law by an administrative officer has 
lh.'l'n recognized in other branch banking cases. National 
Huak of Dctruit v. TVayne Oakland Bank (6th Cir., 1958), 
:23:2 F.:2d 537, cert. denied 1958, 358 U.S. 830, 79 S. Ct. 
;)l)~ :3 L. Eel. 2d 69; Commercial State Bank of Roseville 
c. Oidney (D.C.D.C. 1959), 174 F. Supp. 770, affd. 1960, 
108 F.S. Ap. D.C. 37, 278 F.2d 871; Suburban Trust 
Company v. n-ational Bank of Westfield (D.C.N.J. 1962), 
:211 F. Supp. 694. 
In the Suburban Trust Company case (supra) the 
plaintiff, a state hank, had been authorized by the state 
Ban:k Commissioner to establish a branch banking offiee 
in the Borough of Mountainside, New Jersey, but no 
branch had been constructed or placed in operation under 
such authorization. Before plaintiff's branch was con-
stnlcted and placed in operation, the defendant, a na-
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tional bank, pursuant to permission obtained from the 
Comptroller of the Currency established and opened a 
branch in the same Borough. Plaintiff sought injune;tive 
relief against ·the 1operation of defendant''s branch, and a 
declaratory judgment that such operation was improper 
and tha.t the Comptroller's approval thereof invalid on 
the ground that the state law, which controls the estab-
lishment •of branches by national banks, prohibited such 
branch. A dismissal of the action was sought by the 
defendant on the ground that plaintiff lacked standing 
to srre. Defendant took the position that Congress had 
-entrusted the administration of the National Banking 
Act to the CornptroUer and his determinations in such 
administration were immune fr01n collateral attack by 
third parties in the absence of fraud. In answer to this · 
argument, the court said: 
''We agree with defendant that the courts 
may not review discretionary ae;tion of the Comp-
troller. S.mith v. Vlitherow, supra. However, it 
is not true that he may act ~ontrary to the law 
as the complaints in the cases •at bar assert, and 
not have such action reviewable by the courts." 
Further on in the opinion the court st•ates: 
"Here the plaintiffs are proceeding against 
National, not against the Comptroller upon the 
theory that N·ati'Onal may not operate its branch, 
despite rthe Comptroller's approval. Although 
the situation here differs from that in Commer-
cial State Bank of Roseville v. Gidney, supra, in 
whi~h the plaintiff State bank sought to enj1oin 
the Comptroller's (not already issued) approval 
of a N·ational bank's branch, nevertheless the court 
there held ( p. 780 of 17 4 F. Supp.) that because 
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'any new branch in (the rnunicipality) would have 
to draw its business from the surrotmding com-
munities whloh these plaintiffs already service,' 
the plaintiffs had standing to prosecute the ac-
tion. In the present instance the plaintiff bank 
is not actually in operation, but it has sufficient 
property interest in the certificate of authoriza-
tion granted to it, to entitle it to se·ek relief in 
this Oourt." 
In Stark u. lVickard, 321 U.S. 288, 64 8. Ct. 559, 88 L. 
I·~d. 73:~, Justice R.eed Stark speaking for the Supreme 
Court of the l T n1ted States states the principle as 
follows: 
"When Congress passes an Act etnpowering 
administrative agencies to earry on governrnental 
activities, the power of those agencies is circum-
scribed by the authority granted. This permits 
the courts to participate in law enforcement en-
trusted to administrative bodies only to the extent 
necess'ary to protect justiciable individual rights 
against administrative action fairly beyond the 
granted powers. The responsibility of determining 
the limits of statutory grants of authority in such 
instances is a judicial function entrusted to the 
courts by Congre,ss by the statutes establishing 
courts and marking their jurisdiction. Cf United 
States v. Morgan, 307 U.S. 183, 190, 191, 83 L. Ed. 
1211, 1216, 1217, 59 S. Ot. 795." 
There is a significant line of caS'es on this point in-
,·olYing Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934 (15 U.S.C.A. Sec. 78(j) ), implemented by Regula-
tion X-10B-5 of the Securities Exchange Commission, in 
wl1ich the Federal courts have held that the failure of the 
said regulatory statute to provide for a civil right of 
a::tion does not preclude such an .aetion nor confine 
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its enforcement to the Securities Exchange Con1mission. 
In Fratt v. Robilnson (9 Cir., 1959), 203 F.2d 627, an ac-
tion was brought under said section and regulation imple-
menting the sa1ne, which prohibits any manipulative or 
deceptive device or contrivance in connection ·with the 
purchase or sale of securities by use of any m·eans or 
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or 
of any facility of any national securities exchange. 
Speaking to a motion to dismiss on the ground that 
there is no provision in the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 for a civil caus·e of action for damages in the United 
States District Court under said Statute, the court said 
(p. 631): 
"One of the grounds upon which the motions 
to dismiss were based, was that there is no pro-
vision in the Securities Exchange Acl of 1934 
for a civil cause of action for damages in the 
United States District Court under § 10. That 
there is no such express provision is admitted. 
While the district court spe:cifically denied the 
motion to dismiss on this ground, appellees here 
claim that the dismissal should be affirmed for 
lack of jurisdiclion, and the point wa:s briefed and 
orally argued by the partie'S. 
"It is argued by appellees that Congress in-
tended to confine any enforcement of benefits 
secured to private parties hy the section, to action 
by the Securities and Exchange Commission by 
way of injunction or criminal prosecution. It is 
true that there are several seetions of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act specifically making a civil 
cause of action available, and it is argued by ap-
plication of the rule 'expres·sio unius est exclusio 
alterius' that no civil remedy exists where not 
expressly provided for. 
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"However, the weight of authority and the 
best reasoning, as we see it, bring us to the con-
clusion that a civil cause of action may be brought 
to enforce § 10 as implemented by Securities Ex-
change Commission Regulation X-10B-5, C.F.R. 
Section :2-lO.lOb-5." 
ln concluding their argument with respect to this 
point, defendants contend that Sections 7-1-26 and 7-1-23, 
l Ttah Code Annota.ted 1953, provide a "complete, self-
contained ~ys tem of enforcement" for violation of the 
banking laws, which "negatives the existince of an addi-
tional private right of .action." 
Section 7 -1-2G contained under the chapter dealing 
with the organization and functions of the Stat·e Bank-
ing Department, v-ests in the Bank Commis.sioner " ... 
di~eretionary power in the approval of articles of incor-
poration of institutions subject to the supervision of the 
Ban:king Departn1ent and applications for licenses to 
transart in this state any business subject to sn<:~h super-
vision . . . " The section further provides the ba:sis upon 
which the Bank Cmnmissioner may refuse his approval 
in such cases, and then states "any person feeling ag-
g-rieved by the action, decision or ruling of the Bank 
Comn1issioner under tlvis secti-on may have the same re-
viewed by the State Board of Examiners, whose decision 
shall be final." (Emphasis added) In this connection Sec-
tion 1-1-27 supplements the diS'cretionary power of the 
Bank Commissioner and indicates the scope thereof un-
der Section 7-1-26, said Section 7-1-27 providing that "The 
bank commissioner may for cause at any time revoke the 
certificate of approval and authorization of any foreign 
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corporation authorized to transact any busine·ss in this 
state and subj·ect to the supervision of the banking de-
partment." 
Section 7-1-26 means in substance what it states: 
that the Ban:k Commissioner is vested with discretion-
ary power in authorizing the eS'tablishment of domestic 
institutions subject to the supervision of the Banking 
Department and in authorizing foreign corporations to 
transact in this state any business subject to such super-
vision ; and a person aggrieved by the Bank Commission-
er's refusal to grant such autho-rity may have the same 
reviewed by the State· Board of Examiners. In this con-
nection it should be pointed out that Section 7-1-2.6, prior 
to its amendn1ent in 1963, provided no time limitation 
within which such review must be sought and pre-
s·cribed no notice, pro-cedure or hearing for such re~ew. 
Moreover, the section n1akes no mention of branch banks 
which, within the limitati'ons provided in Section 7-3-6, 
may be established with the consent nf the B·ank Commis-
sioner and approval of the Governor without notice or 
hearing. 
If defendants' proposition with respect to the ef-
fe>C5t of Sections 7-1-26 and 7-1-23 were sustained, it would 
1nean tha.t the B.ank Commissioner with the approval 
of the Gove·rnor could violate the Branch B·anking Act 
with absolute ilnmunity from judicial review. An appli-
cation for a branch bank could be filed, approved and a 
branch ban:k established in a single day, without notice 
or hearing, a.nd according to defendants, the sole remedy 
available if the law were violated in such case, is that 
provided for under Section 7-1-23 which reads: 
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''7 -1-23. Commi~Himwr to notify county at-
torney of violations.-It shall be the duty of the 
bank eonunissioner to infonn the eounty attorney 
ot' the eounty in which the bank or other institu-
tion is lo(';ated of any violation of any of the pro-
vi·sions of law which constitute·s a misdemeanor 
or felony by any officer, director or employee of 
any institution under the supervision of the bank-
ing department which shall come to his notice, 
and upon rec-eipt of such information the county 
attorney shall institute proceedings to enf·orce the 
provisions of law." 
It is submitted that this proposition .advanced by 
defendants is not only contrary to the law enunciated 
in thP authorities hereinabove cited, but violates the 
rudimentary require·ments of due process. In this con-
nection it is interesting to note that two of the three 
members constituting the Board of Examiners, which 
<H·eon~ing to defendan~ts would have the final deci'Sion 
in thi::; case, are the Governor who· approved the action 
of the Bank Omnmissioner, and· the Attorney General 
tmder whose advice he acted and who has the duty to 
drL'nd his official .acts. 
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CONCLUSION 
It is submitted that the judgment of the trial court 
should be affirmed because the establishment of the 
branch hank by the defendant bank in Provo was in viola-
tion of the law, for which plaintiff has a right of action 
and has invoked a proper remedy to enforce the same. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Joseph S. Jones 
C. E. Henderson 
RAY, RAWLIN8, JONES 
& HENDERSON 
800 Walker Bank Building 
Salt Lruke City, Utah 
Attorneys f·or Respondent 
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